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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze key factors in Poland’s decision-making 
concerning the European Union’s European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The 
thesis reviews the emergence of the EU’s ESDP and Polish involvement in these events. 
The thesis examines the main considerations that guided Poland in assessing the 
European Union’s emerging security and defense dimension.  
This topic is important for three reasons. First, Poland’s stand regarding the EU’s 
European Security and Defense Policy is a test of the country’s readiness to participate in 
the process of European integration. Second, in contrast with the discussions in the 
1990s, today’s debate on the construction of the European Union’s defense capabilities 
covers more than the theory. This construction is one of the most dynamic processes in 
the European integration movement. In this sense, Poland’s decision to become a member 
of the EU has a political meaning and provides a signal to the rest of the candidates in 
terms of its future behavior. Third, the process of forming the European Union’s military 
capabilities, particularly the formulation in December 1999 of the Headline Goal, is 
closely connected with ongoing processes in NATO concerning narrowing the gap 
between United States and European military capabilities. Therefore, Poland as a member 
of NATO is not only interested in such plans being fulfilled but is also actively involved 
in this process.  
B. MAJOR QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENT 
 This thesis investigates the causes of political controversy over Poland’s 
participation in the European Security and Defense Policy. In addition, this thesis 
considers the possibility that the European Security and Defense Policy may be the first 
step towards making the European Union’s defense independent of NATO influence. 
This implies that the EU might become a collective defense organization. Poland’s 
participation in the ESDP does not fully reflect its national interests concerning Euro-
Atlantic cooperation. Poland as a NATO member perceives the ESDP as a threat to Euro-
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Atlantic relations. To accomplish this task – that is, gaining a better understanding of the 
controversy associated with Poland’s participation in the ESDP - three fundamental 
questions need to be addressed. First, what is the position of Poland as a member of 
NATO towards the ESDP? In other words, since the country is already fully engaged in 
Euro-Atlantic security as a NATO member, what motivates Poland to take part in the 
ESDP? Second, knowing that Poland will join the EU in May 2004, what has been 
Poland’s position as a candidate for membership in the European Union towards the 
ESDP? Lastly, and most importantly, what are the elements affecting the perception of 
the ESDP in Poland? 
C. BACKGROUND 
Analyzing Poland’s position concerning the European Union’s European Security 
and Defense Policy to determine the essence of the problem is difficult. If EU diplomats 
quoted by the press and the comments and statements by western European experts are to 
be believed, Polish politicians have treated the process of establishing an EU security and 
defense dimension with considerable distrust, perceiving it as a threat to Euro-Atlantic 
relations. Furthermore, since Poland desires to become an EU member quickly, its doubts 
about the ESDP have not been openly expressed. Polish leaders, therefore, treat the 
relevant European Union plans as unavoidable.  
Polish diplomats and politicians argue that their reactions are not a result of their 
dislike of the concept as such but merely of the manner in which the EU has decided to 
establish the new European Security and Defense Policy bodies and mechanisms. In the 
Poles’ opinion, the conduct of the members of the European Union has been jeopardizing 
the structure of Euro-Atlantic security, thus possibly leading to a situation in which 
NATO and the EU, instead of cooperating, would compete with each other. The 
numerous uncertainties and doubts of the Poles focus on two issues: the inappropriate 
manner of building relations between NATO and the EU, and the failure of the European 
Union’s policy to give enough attention to the views of the six non-EU European 
members of NATO (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland, and 
Turkey).  
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Meanwhile, the Poles have found the ESDP from the very beginning frightening. 
At the beginning, the EU was unable to propose detailed solutions regarding NATO-EU 
relations because the ESDP was in the process of being developed and the European 
Union members themselves had to rethink many issues. Besides that, the EU by nature is 
an institution closed to non-members. To the charges of blocking access to European 
Union documents and of disregarding Poland’s need to consult about ESDP matters, the 
EU responded that Poland has not properly employed informal information channels.  
As the positions of Poland and the EU have evolved, the views of the two parties 
have moved closer together. Polish views have been reflected in the relevant conclusions 
of successive European Council meetings. Polish diplomats openly recognize that 
following the European Council meetings at Feira and Nice, the majority of the policies 
favored by Warsaw related to the specific role of the six non-EU European members of 
NATO and to the EU’s relations with NATO were included in the Presidency 
Conclusions.  
Nevertheless, in thinking about the European Union’s security and defense policy 
the Poles are still apprehensive that:  
EU countries may not fulfill their commitments concerning the acquisition of  the 
Headline Goal capabilities while the already existing ESDP bodies may make 
cooperation with the Alliance more difficult; 
 The European Union’s security and defense policy may give rise to operations 
without paying enough attention to the US position and, at the same time, allow Russia to 
exert greater influence on security affairs in Europe.  
D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This thesis analyzes Polish debates about the European Union’s ESDP since 1999 
and the current Polish policy concerning the ESDP. The thesis is primarily based on 
official Polish and European Union sources, including declarations, speeches and 
documents related to the development and problems of the European Union’s security 
and defense policy. The secondary sources include scholarly analyses, press articles and 
interviews.  
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This thesis is limited to certain aspects of the European Union’s security and 
defense policy. The legal and institutional questions are reduced to the necessary 
minimum; and a number of detailed problems, which have important political 
implications, have not been accounted for or have only been mentioned briefly in this 
thesis. 
E. CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II examines the position of Poland as a 
member of NATO regarding the EU’s ESDP. This includes the evolution of Poland’s 
position concerning its national interests and security issues before and after joining 
NATO as well as particular positions towards the ESDP. Chapter III provides an analysis 
of Poland’s position as a candidate for membership in the European Union regarding the 
ESDP. The chapter includes the Polish viewpoint on defense and security concerns in 
Europe as well as factors that have led to enhanced cooperation between Poland and the 
European Union in anticipation of Poland’s membership in May 2004. Finally, this 
chapter analyzes the preferred Polish vision for the EU’s future security role: as a 
stabilizing factor in Europe rather than a superpower or counterbalance to the United 
States. Chapter IV offers an analysis of elements affecting the perception of the EU’s 
ESDP in Poland, including lack of confidence in the European Union, and perceptions of 
possible threats to international security. The final chapter offers recommendations about 
developing the ESDP in a manner consistent with Polish security interests. This chapter 
also provides a summary of the key findings. It analyses the prospects for Poland’s future 
involvement in ESDP crisis management.  
F. OUTLINE 
Chapter I: Introduction 
A. Statement of purpose  
B. Major questions and argument  
C. Background 
D. Methodology and sources 
E. Chapter-by-chapter summary 
F. Outline 
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Chapter II: ESDP and Poland as a member of NATO 
A. Evolution of Poland’s position towards the ESDP 
B. Current Polish policy 
Chapter III: ESDP and Poland as a candidate for membership in the European 
Union 
A. Polish points of view 
B. Enhanced cooperation 
C. Europe: Superpower or “Stabilizing Factor” 
Chapter IV: Elements affecting perceptions of the ESDP in Poland 
A. Lack of confidence in the European Union 
B. Perception of International Security 
C. Russian and French policies 
Chapter V: Conclusions 
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II. ESDP AND POLAND AS A MEMBER OF NATO 
A. EVOLUTION OF POLAND’S POSITION TOWARDS THE ESDP 
Polish politicians expected that the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 
would produce precise answers to the questions raised at the Cologne European Council 
in June the same year, when the European Union decided to develop and strengthen its 
collective security and defense policy. However, the Helsinki summit not only did not 
reach the expected decisions but even caused concerns with regard to the direction the 
EU’s ESDP concept could follow.1  
The Presidency Progress Report to the Helsinki European Council on 
strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defense declared that: 
 The European Union should have the autonomous capacity to take decisions and, 
where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and then to conduct EU-led military 
operations in response to international crises in support of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP)… Upon a decision by the Council to launch an operation, the 
non-EU European NATO members will participate if they so wish, in the event of an 
operation requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. They will, on a decision by 
the Council, be invited to take part in operations where the EU does not use NATO 
assets… Russia, Ukraine and other European States engaged in political dialogue with 
the Union and other interested States may be invited to take part in the EU-led 
operations.2 
In Poland’s opinion the wording of the Presidency Report was too vague and 
placed NATO’s European allies on an equal level with the EU’s other partners, the 
European Union membership candidate countries plus Russia and Ukraine. The 
Presidency Report did not specify the framework and extent of the EU-NATO 
cooperation as well as its regularity and contents. Warsaw found the Presidency Report’s 
                                                 
1 O.Osica, Wspólna europejska polityka bezpieczeństwa i obrony w perspektywie Polski, Centrum 
Stosunków Międzynarodowych, Warszawa 2001, p. 18. 
2 Presidency Progress Report to the Helsinki European Council on Strengthening the Common 
European Policy on Security and Defense, http://ue.eu.int/en/Info/eurocouncil/index.htm 
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statement concerning the possible participation of the non-EU European members of 
NATO in EU-led military operations with the use of NATO assets insufficient, because 
the report failed to clarify how in practice such participation would work. Moreover, 
Polish leaders noted that the declarations concerning cooperation between NATO and the 
EU’s newly established temporary bodies for the ESDP as well as concerning defense 
planning by both organizations and the status of rapid reaction forces, which had to be 
established by 2003, were as uncertain and unclear.3   
Owing to several disputes generated by media reports on the establishment within 
the EU of a “duplicate” of NATO, the political atmosphere between the Cologne and 
Helsinki summits had a huge influence on Polish attitudes concerning the EU’s ESDP. 
Although Polish Defense Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz did not conceal his concerns 
about the “lack of clarity” in the EU plans, he emphasized that “life itself” and “financial 
realities” would impose solutions “close to our expectations.”4 Likewise, the Polish 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bronislaw Geremek, argued that the Helsinki Presidency 
Report concerning the EU’s ESDP did not convince him. However, he stressed, Poland 
had achieved at least the success that no one had attacked its position on the Helsinki 
Presidency Report.5 This experience was even more painful because Polish diplomats 
remembered how “at the time when Poland was driving towards NATO membership, we 
felt that we were treated by the Americans and by the military diplomacy of NATO 
countries with sympathy and respect.”6 In contrast, in the EU framework Polish 
diplomats not only felt that they were being ignored, but they also could hear the opinion 
expressed that if Poland did not want to participate in the proposed initiatives, at least it 
“should not disturb” them.7  
Several days after the Helsinki summit, at the meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council in Brussels, Polish Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek, in his speech 
                                                 
3 PAP serwis dotyczacy Wojska Polskiego, 16 grudnia 1999, http://www.pap.com.pl
4 Report following The North Atlantic Council in Defense Ministers session held in Brussels, 2-3 
December 1999, http://www.pap.com.pl 
5 J. Pawlicki, Korpus bedzie, szczegoly potem, Gazeta Wyborcza, 16 December 1999, p.8. 
6 B. Geremek, Jestesmy czescia Zachodu, Gazeta Wyborcza, 5-6 May 2000, p.14. 
7 R. Kuzniar, Nadmiar wizji, brak konkretow, Tygodnik Powszechny, No. 41/2000, p.3. 
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concerning the EU’s ESDP, was explicit. While assuring his audience about Poland‘s 
general support for the EU Helsinki decisions, he did not conceal his concerns about the 
implications for the future of NATO. He argued that “Security (hard and soft) comes first 
for us in Poland. We cannot afford for NATO to lose its vitality. In an era of 
experimentation let’s not forget the lasting value of trans-Atlantic integration. In this 
context we consider the EU Presidency’s Report on Strengthening the Common 
European Policy on Security and Defense a tangible outcome of the discussion, which 
has progressed much since the Cologne European Council. It confirms the commitment 
and determination on the part of the EU Member States to strengthen in particular 
European practical capabilities for crisis management as the adoption of the European 
Headline Goal proves. Thus we perceive it also as providing a significant reinforcement 
of our Alliance as well as our share of burden in the transatlantic link that, while 
rebalanced, remains vital for the security of our continent. When pursuing the process we 
should not spend to much time discussing about the architecture but rather about 
capabilities coupled with adaptability and mobility.”8 In Geremek’s opinion, the EU’s 
ESDP as well as NATO play crucial roles in Europe. “This new dimension of Europe 
must however, evolve from the security requirements of the new Europe and not only by 
conscious and institutional design.”9 The Polish foreign minister also advised against the 
creation in Europe of inner and external circles based on the new mechanisms. He 
proposed that relations between the EU and the six non-EU European members of NATO 
be based on the WEU mechanisms.10  
In May 2000 Geremek developed these views in presenting the basic directions of 
Polish foreign policy to the Polish Parliament. The Polish foreign minister noted that 
Poland welcomed the EU initiative concerning the strengthening of the CFSP through the 
development of the ESDP. “We submitted our opinion on the ESDP to the EU summit in 
Helsinki and expressed our readiness to fully participate in the shaping of European 
                                                 
8 B. Geremek, On European Security and Defense Policy, North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 15 
December 1999, www.polonya.org.tr/sec5-ue-nato-esdi-pl-position.htm 
9 Ibid. 
10 O.Osica, op.cit., p. 19. 
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political and defense capabilities to make it possible to conduct operations in crisis 
situations, and we voiced our expectations both as a NATO member state and, in the near 
future, a full EU member.” However, he added,  
We support the EU decisions on the assumption that all the solutions 
proposed aim at bolstering and harmonizing EU and NATO functionality 
as well as strengthening the European security pillar, the trans-Atlantic 
bonds, and the US commitment to European security. Our practical aim is 
to create conditions allowing the EU to undertake military action and 
operations in specific situations requiring action short of involvement of 
NATO as a whole. Having this in mind, we are determined to promote 
maximum harmony and institutional coherence in EU-NATO cooperation. 
We want to establish for ourselves particular conditions relating to our 
participation in the EU structures responsible for the ESDP, which should 
take into consideration our NATO membership. We will also be striving 
for the maintenance at the highest possible level of cohesion between the 
NATO Defense Capabilities Initiative and the European Headline Goals 
proposed for implementation within the framework of the EU.11  
He also argued that such capability improvement processes should be pursued 
without an atmosphere of competition that could undermine NATO and the EU.12  
Nevertheless, an atmosphere of competition prevailed during the spring of 2000, 
convincing politicians in Poland that the concept of the EU’s ESDP involved jeopardy 
and that this concept, contrary to the official declarations, aimed not at strengthening 
Euro-Atlantic ties but rather weakening them. The main factor responsible for this 
situation remained the method of dialogue with NATO adopted by a group of EU states, 
particularly France. This method was based on the assumption that first the EU member 
states had to decide about their goals concerning ESDP, create decision-making 
mechanisms and other appropriate bodies, and only then and only on that basis pursue 
talks with the Alliance or simply inform its members about the EU’s established position. 
Therefore, the EU refused to convene regular meetings or to provide access to all 
                                                 
11 B.Geremek, Oswiadczenie Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych dotyczace kierunkow polskiej polityki 
zagranicznej wygloszone w Sejmie RP, 9 maj 2000, www.sejm.gov.pl 
12 Ibid. 
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documents for the non-EU European members of NATO, offering instead informal 
consultations and meetings.13  
To some extent the impasse was broken in June 2000. The European Council at 
Feira decided to establish four working groups to define relations between NATO and the 
EU’s ESDP and the rules according to which the EU could have access to Alliance assets. 
The efforts made by these groups helped to solve many problems. However, as Polish 
diplomats emphasized, in practical cooperation between NATO and EU planners, 
complications persist regarding details that remain unexplained.14 
The improvement in the atmosphere of EU-NATO relations has had a positive 
impact on Poland’s position concerning the EU’s ESDP. In June 2000 the Polish Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs sent the EU member states a document entitled “Proposals for 
Practical Development of the Feira Decisions Concerning EU Cooperation with Non-EU 
European Allies.” It contained the Polish interpretation of the rules concerning the EU’s 
future cooperation with non-EU European members of NATO as established by the 
Portuguese Presidency which ended in June 2000. This document also submitted the 
postulates concerning such cooperation addressed to the next EU Presidency, that of 
France. A comparison of this document and the Presidency report regarding the EU’s 
ESDP accepted in Nice in December 2000 shows that both parties achieved their basic 
goals.15 However, this did not mean that everything became clear concerning cooperation 
between NATO and the EU. 
In a speech at Warsaw University in May 2001, the Polish foreign minister, 
Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, observed that “the principles implemented by the EU applying 
to its relations with third countries, particularly with the NATO members aspiring to 
membership in the EU, in point of fact do not allow for a possibility of cooperation with 
regard to the ESDP. Consultations or dialogue will not replace regular cooperation.”16 
                                                 
13 O.Osica, op.cit., s. 20. 
14 Op.cit., s.21. 
15 The Presidency’s report was accepted at the meeting of the General Affairs Council in 4 December 
2000, http:// ue.eu.int 
16 W. Bartoszewski, Europejska polityka bezpieczeństwa – polski punkt widzenia, speech at Warsaw 
University, 11 May 2001, www.msz.gov.pl  
 11
The Polish foreign minister mentioned also a number of specific questions to which, in 
his opinion, no clear answers had been given as yet:  
a. How would the EU strategic concept be defined? 
b. Where, in the geographical sense, was the EU going to use its forces and in what 
specific circumstances? 
c. How would the EU’s military operations be carried out? 
d. What should be the extent of planning and military training? 
e. How in practice would decision-making proceed with regard to specific crisis 
management operations?17 
Nevertheless, taking into consideration the well judged wording of the minister’s 
entire statement as well as that of the document prepared by the ministry in the part 
concerning the EU’s ESDP, it is clear that at that time the developing concept of ESDP 
did not cause much confrontation. This was partly a result of the shift of focus to a 
number of technical questions. Another factor was the suspension of progress on the 
modalities of EU-NATO relations as a result of Turkish objections.18 Uncertainties about 
the position of the new US Administration with regard to the EU’s ESDP concept also 
had to be resolved.19 
Why did Polish politicians pay so much attention to the issue of participation by 
the six non-EU European members of NATO in the EU’s ESDP, even though Poland 
would soon itself be an EU member? In other words, were purposeful considerations 
involved in Poland’s cooperation with the five non-EU European NATO allies? For 
instance, did Warsaw intend to increase pressure on the EU to give more attention to the 
Polish position, or to all non-EU NATO allies, including at some point the United States?  
Undoubtedly, from the Polish point of view, the creation of a common forum with 
the Czech Republic and Hungary for discussion and pressure on the EU would improve 
the position of these countries. This in turn could be important in a situation in which 
                                                 
17 Ibid. 
18 Turkey demanded for its representative a permanent position within the bodies responsible for the 
EU’s ESDP. This in turn was the condition for Turkey’s permission to allow the EU access to the 
Alliance’s defense planning. This in turn was one of the principles by which NATO countries had agreed to 
support EU operations using NATO assets, O. Osica, op.cit., s. 20.  
19 Op. cit., s. 22. 
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enlargement took place after the EU’s ESDP had proved to be effective.20 Consequently, 
the creation of a special, favored status for non-EU European members of NATO could 
be regarded as an investment in the future. Therefore, a group of nations sharing similar 
views on international security might be able to protect transatlantic ties by influencing 
the EU’s decisions about autonomous operations and about operations conducted in 
cooperation with NATO. Even if the status of the European NATO allies that are not 
members of the EU does not give them a right of veto, it guarantees them a right of 
consultations. In practice it may in some circumstances constitute an effective instrument 
of pressure. The effectiveness of this instrument may increase when the security concerns 
of both organizations focus on certain geographical directions - for instance, toward 
Russia.21  
However, the cooperation undertaken together with the Czechs and the 
Hungarians as fellow aspirants to EU membership did not produce any positive results 
because neither in the Czech Republic nor in Hungary did the development of the EU’s 
ESDP give rise to as much concern as it did in Poland. Moreover, these two southern 
neighbors of Poland were interested in preventing the disputes about their status within 
the ESDP framework from having an adverse effect on their relations with the EU and on 
the negotiations concerning their prospective EU membership.22 
In addition to the six non-EU European members of NATO, Poland had at its 
disposal another instrument which could serve as an influence on the ESDP’s 
development, the Weimar Triangle. From the moment it was established in 1994, it was 
regarded by its founders – Berlin, Paris, and Warsaw - as a most important and useful 
round-table for political cooperation concerning European security. For Polish politicians 
it would seem that this forum appeared to be not only the most effective approach, but 
also one that might have emphasized the politically unique position and role of Poland in 
European security.23  However, in the event the Weimar Triangle proved to be of no 
                                                 
20 Op. cit., s. 23. 
21 Polska Zbrojna, 20 May 2001, p. 12. 
22 O. Osica, op. cit., s. 24. 
23 F. Draus, Trojkat Wajmarski – w poszukiwaniu sensu, Przeglad Srodkowo Europejski, 
http://www.medianet.pl/~ceurorev/numer21/08.htm 
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use.24 Polish diplomats maintained that their attempts to use the Weimar Triangle to deal 
with the most important Polish concerns about the EU’s ESDP failed, first and foremost, 
due to France’s policy. During the bilateral talks with the Germans it was possible to 
reach a conclusion with regard to the defense planning questions. However, during the 
trilateral deliberations, Germany withdrew to the French position and refused to discuss 
the ESDP issues in the Weimar forum. Polish-French relations had been deteriorating 
since the Helsinki summit, partly as a consequence of differing priorities. Both countries 
were attempting to be the guardians of greater values, the French of their conception of 
European values and the Poles of trans-Atlantic values.25   
In the sphere of security most Polish politicians remained strongly supportive of 
the Atlantic Alliance in their reasoning. A partial explanation of this support was that 
Poland’s political class tends to focus on collective defense guarantees. In Poland there is 
great enthusiasm for NATO, which is natural for a new member that has just realized its 
aspirations. Moreover, a lack of understanding as to the goals and future role of the EU’s 
ESDP led many Polish politicians and military authorities to doubt the utility of this 
concept. Therefore, the Polish debate concerning the EU’s ESDP did not fully address the 
future role of the EU on the international stage or the geographical scope of its policies.26   
B. CURRENT POLISH POLICY 
In 2000, Henryk Szlajfer, the long-time Director of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs’ Department for Policy Planning, mentioned three elements that, in his opinion, 
affected Poland’s attitude to the European Union’s European Security and Defense 
Policy: 
• Poland’s membership in NATO, 
• Poland’s associate membership in the Western European Union, and 
• Poland’s aspiration to be a member of the EU.27 
                                                 
24 Speech given by the head of the National Security Bureau Marek Siwiec, National Security Bureau 
Meeting, 22 February 2001, www.bbn.pl  
25 F. Draus, op.cit. 
26 R.Trzaskowski, From Candidate to Member State: Poland and the Future of the EU, Occasional 
Papers, No. 37, EU ISS, September 2002, www.iss-eu.org  
27 H. Szlajfer, Kształtowanie europejskiej polityki bezpieczeństwa i obrony: polska perspektywa, 
Rocznik Strategiczny, 1999/2000, p.33-34. 
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Consequently, the official position of Poland as a member of NATO is consistent 
with that of the Alliance and comprises the conclusions of the April 1999 Washington 
Summit concerning the principles of NATO support for the EU’s defense and security 
policy. These principles take into consideration three types of future military operations 
involving members of the EU: NATO operations, autonomous EU missions, and EU 
operations with potential NATO support.28   
Poland’s position also takes account of the principles that the American Secretary 
of State, Madeleine Albright, formulated in response to the Franco-British St. Malo 
initiative in December 1998, the so-called three Ds (no decoupling, no duplication, and 
no discrimination). 
As Europeans look at the best way to organise their foreign and security 
policy cooperation, the key is to make sure that any institutional change is 
consistent with basic principles that have served the Atlantic partnership 
well for 50 years. This means avoiding what I would call the Three Ds: 
decoupling, duplication, and discrimination.  
First, we want to avoid decoupling: NATO is the expression of the 
indispensable transatlantic link. It should remain an organisation of 
sovereign allies, where European decision-making is not unhooked from 
broader alliance decision-making.  
Second, we want to avoid duplication: defence resources are too scarce for 
allies to conduct force planning, operate command structures, and make 
procurement decisions twice - once at NATO and once more at the EU. 
And third, we want to avoid any discrimination against NATO members 
who are not EU members.  
 Poland assumes that the development of the European Union’s capabilities to 
carry out the Petersberg Tasks and potentially other missions is in the interest of both the 
EU and NATO, and that such development will favor a general enhancement of security 
in Europe. Moreover, the creation of EU crisis management capabilities in cooperation 
with NATO should strengthen transatlantic relations and thus the stability of the 
continent. For that reason, the elements describing the specific character of the Polish 
                                                 
28 The Reader’s Guide to the NATO Summit in Washington, 23-25 April 1999, p. 65. 
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position regarding the EU’s ESDP are to be outlined not only in the postulates as such but 
also in the reasoning behind them.29  
Poland supports strong transatlantic ties based on the US commitment to 
European security. Similarly, the assessment of the desired direction of the EU’s ESDP 
depends largely on whether it binds the United States to Europe or whether it contributes 
to the emergence of new problems between the United States and the European Union.30   
Another strongly emphasized postulate of Polish diplomacy holds that work on 
the EU’s ESDP and proposed solutions should be adopted as a result of a transparent and 
open discussion in which all EU and NATO countries take part. Irrespective of the 
character of potential challenges, the cohesion and efficiency of the system of Euro-
Atlantic security can be guaranteed only through a clear and efficient mechanism of EU-
NATO cooperation in making appropriate decisions in specific crisis situations. Such a 
mechanism should apply to the EU’s autonomous operations as well.31 
The particular nature of the Polish position is also a result of Poland’s status as an 
associate member of the Western European Union (WEU). The EU’s European Security 
and Defense Policy concept presupposed that in certain circumstances non-EU European 
members of NATO might take part in the EU’s decision shaping and defense planning. 
The preferences Poland expressed to the EU called for including the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland, and Turkey, as the six non-EU European members of 
NATO, in the framework of the EU Military Committee and Military Staff, with a 
possibility of full participation in the decision shaping process concerning the EU’s 
political and strategic direction. Moreover, the forces declared by the six non-EU 
European members of NATO at the EU Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels 
in November 2000 should be included in the catalogue of forces to meet the European 
Union’s December 1999 Headline Goal.32 
                                                 
29 W. Bartoszewski, op. cit. 
30 O.Osica, op. cit., p. 15. 
31 H. Szlajfer, op. cit., p. 35. 
32 O. Osica, op. cit., p. 15. 
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From the Polish perspective, the objective was to create the EU’s ESDP on the 
basis of principles derived from the traditions of the WEU, including the rights and 
obligations of the associate members. Based on this method, according to the official 
Polish interpretation, the EU would avoid discrimination against non-EU European 
members of NATO. The EU was supposed to refrain from such discrimination under the 
relevant conclusions of the NATO Washington Summit and with respect to the last of 
U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s three Ds, namely no discrimination.33 
With regard to the existing policy, Poland acted on the assumption that NATO’s 
European allies had unique contributions to make in future EU security and defense 
policy operations. That uniqueness was based not merely on their membership in the 
Alliance, but first and foremost on their geographical position which, especially in the 
cases of Poland, Turkey and Hungary, should not be ignored when planning EU 
operations in eastern and southeastern Europe. As Defense Minister Bronislaw 
Komorowski argued, “with regards to security matters, to maintain a largely artificial 
division between the EU and NATO is, in practice, a dangerous and also absurd idea as 
all countries will face the same problems.”34 
Considering the objective and lasting military weakness that will probably burden 
the EU for at least another decade, the six non-EU European members of NATO might 
offer a valuable complement to the EU defense capabilities. Moreover, these countries 
have planned their defense within the framework of the Alliance and have gained 
experience in NATO operations; they are therefore fully able to cooperate in situations 
requiring a rapid response.  
From a Polish point of view, the EU’s ESDP must not be based on anti-American 
sentiments. This would be dangerous and could result in the destruction of transatlantic 
unity. The EU’s ESDP may be useful for solving the burden-sharing problem in 
transatlantic relations, but it should never replace the NATO role in crisis management. 
In the words of Pawel Zurawski, a Polish expert on international security affairs, “The 
                                                 
33 W. Bartoszewski, op. cit. 
34 The statement by Minister of National Defense Bronislaw Komorowski at the Capabilities 
Commitment Conference in Brussels, 21 November 2000, www.mon.gov.pl  
 17
EU can lead post-conflict stabilization missions, but without US logistical help and 
political leadership, European states will not be able to act in an ongoing conflict in the 
unpredictable future.”35 
In summary, Poland as a member of NATO and an associate member of the WEU 
assumed (a) that the EU should shape the ESDP in consultation with NATO and (b) that 
the decisions taken should ensure that cooperation between these two organizations 
would maintain harmony, both in peacetime as well as during military operations. This 
includes the need to maintain the cohesion of the two organizations’ defense planning, in 
particular contingency planning, and to define the geographic extent of future EU 
operations with regard to concrete situations in which the EU may choose to act.36 
As Polish diplomats maintain, the last postulate is significant because even a 
small conflict can spread to neighboring countries. In such a case, if the EU undertook 
action at the first stage of conflict, the autonomous European Union forces might turn out 
to be inadequate and in need of support from the Alliance. It is conceivable that EU 
operations carried out, for example, in the south of Europe (for instance, in Serbia or the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) might end in defeat, and that an adversary 
might threaten a non-EU European member of NATO (for instance, Bulgaria or 
Romania), not necessarily a country taking part in the operation. In this event, under 
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, NATO involvement would become necessary. In 
other words, the unpredictability of conflict situations makes it prudent to base 
cooperation between the EU and NATO on clear and pragmatic rules.37 
The current Polish strategy of national security calls for Poland to participate in 
the strengthening of international peace, both regionally and globally, binding its security 
with that of the Euro-Atlantic area. The country has contributed forces to operations in 
the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. By maintaining positive relations with the United 
                                                 
35 P. Zurawski, ESDP: A View from Poland, European Institute, Lodz University, November 2003, p. 
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36 W. Bartoszewski, op. cit. 
37 O. Osica, op. cit., s. 16. 
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States, Poland intends to influence EU and US policies while promoting the construction 
of a strategic partnership between the European Union and the United States.38 
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III. ESDP AND POLAND AS A CANDIDATE FOR MEMBERSHIP 
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
A. POLISH POINTS OF VIEW 
An analysis of Poland’s policy towards ESDP as a candidate for membership in 
the EU can be reduced to the two central areas. The first area represents the current 
aspects of the establishment of the ESDP, including the implementation of the decisions 
following EU summits. The second area is focused on the discussion about the future of 
European integration, notably with regard to the EU’s role in a global context.39 
The basis for consideration in the first area is provided by two documents 
generated by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, namely “Intergovernmental 
Conference 2000 – the Polish Position” and “Treaty of Nice – the Polish Point of View.” 
Although neither of these documents contributes much to solving the problems of the 
EU’s security and defense policies, they undeniably reflect Polish thinking on the shape 
and future functioning of the EU’s second pillar.  
The document entitled “Intergovernmental Conference 2000 – the Polish 
Position” states that at the present stage of the EU’s ESDP development no EU members 
support giving Poland any privileges with regard to the EU’s second pillar. As the 
necessary resources for taking the relevant steps are found in the first pillar, which is at 
the disposal of the European Commission, the European Commission has great influence 
with reference to the development within the ESDP of the capabilities responsible for the 
civilian aspects of crisis management.  Therefore, a key question is whether operations 
for civilian crisis management are considered only a support for military operations or a 
separate element of the EU’s security policy. In the first case, the European 
Commission’s composition and the potential majority vote system may become important 
to the future of the EU’s ESDP and Poland’s influence on this policy. The Polish Foreign 
Ministry’s document on the 2000 Intergovernmental Conference also states that the 
codification of the Helsinki decisions concerning the establishment of the new bodies 
responsible for implementation of the ESDP should clearly define the prerogatives of 
                                                 
39 O. Osica, op. cit., p. 25. 
 21
these bodies and their relationship with already existing institutions -- for instance, the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives.40   
However, this document does not specify whether Poland advocates leaving the 
ESDP in the hands of the EU national governments or whether it supports in this area a 
certain role for the EU institutions -- for instance, the EU Parliament or the European 
Commission. Nor does this document define clearly the prerogatives of the new bodies 
responsible for the implementation of the EU’s ESDP. Moreover, the document does not 
devote enough attention to the central problem of the overlapping functions of the High 
Representative for the CFSP and the External Relations Commissioner. Although the 
continuing rivalry between the politicians exercising these functions makes the problem 
sensitive, in point of fact the question is focused on the role of the EU Council and the 
EU Commission in the process of undertaking actions within the scope of the EU’s 
ESDP.41 
The document issued by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs entitled “Treaty of 
Nice – the Polish Point of View” elaborates the position presented in the document for 
the EU Intergovernmental Conference in 2000. However, this text does not contain any 
new elements. Instead, it emphasizes once again the complementarities to NATO of the 
EU’s ESDP and the need to base the ESDP on consultation and cooperation. 
We hope that changes in the decision-making procedure will contribute to 
greater effectiveness in the CFSP. A more precise definition of the 
principles of making agreements should permit the signing of agreements 
aimed at the implementation of the CFSP, including an agreement on EU-
NATO cooperation in crisis management. […] The establishment of the 
Political and Security Committee and vesting it with significant 
prerogatives with regard to security policy and crisis management 
constitute an important change in the internal structure of the EU bodies as 
well as granting greater prerogatives to the EU. We believe that the taking 
over by the EU of the WEU tasks should involve a broader approach to 
security problems, based on participation and cooperation with all the 
                                                 
40 Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Intergovernmental Conference 2000: the Polish Position, 
Warszawa 2000, 
http://www.sprawymiedzynarodowe.pl/yearbook/2001/intergovernmental_conference_2000.html 
41 Op. cit., p. 26. 
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countries showing the will and potential to establish such cooperation. The 
EU’s ESDP should be based on cooperation with NATO.42         
This document also stressed that “Poland’s favorable attitude towards the 
development of the EU’s ESDP goes together with the expectation that ESDP will be a 
realistic policy,” which in turn means that “the EU will develop adequate military 
capabilities.”43  
B. ENHANCED COOPERATION 
Poland’s position regarding enhanced cooperation with the EU’s ESDP assumes 
that its initiation is feasible on condition that this cooperation serves as a method of 
European integration and that no group of countries establishes any new bodies. In 
addition, the mechanism of closer cooperation must not exclude new member states from 
some of the areas of the “politique communautaire.”44  
To improve cohesion in the European Union, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Wladyslaw Bartoszewski argued that “we must bring the idea closer to the broad public 
by attempting to put it into practice in those spheres of European politics that are seen as 
priorities in the eyes of citizens. This could, for instance, be the sphere of internal 
security, especially elements such as migration policy, combating drugs and organized 
crime or police and judicial cooperation.”45  
Simultaneously, in the document “Intergovernmental Conference 2000: the Polish 
Position” the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that “the proposal to formally 
extend closer cooperation to cover the second pillar should be approached with caution, it 
being a new area, undergoing very rapid change, where a range of important decisions 
have to be taken, including, for example, a stronger involvement of non-EU NATO 
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member states; it would be therefore advisable to postpone the debate on the issue until 
the principles of CESDP functioning are specified.”46  
This, in turn, could suggest that as long as enhanced cooperation does not apply to 
defense policy, the EU will not become a collective defense organization. In principle, 
this fact can be recognized as the most likely reason for Poland’s caution with regard to 
the creation of such an organization within the EU. Moreover, if it can be argued that the 
NATO – EU relationship exerts the strongest influence on Poland’s attitude towards the 
EU’s ESDP, which in the context of the above document seems to be justified, the reason 
why appears to be as follows: even if, following the postulates of the authors of the 
document “Intergovernmental Conference 2000,” the institutional framework of the 
second pillar were defined first and the role of the non-EU European members of NATO 
were explained next, any closer cooperation among EU members in defense policy would 
mean further distancing of this group of EU countries from the non-EU European 
members of NATO.47 
On the other hand, European members of the Alliance that are also members of 
the EU could pursue closer military cooperation which could lead to the creation within 
NATO of a powerful inner circle whose political importance and military contribution 
would balance that of the United States.48 
Is the strong Polish fear that enhanced cooperation in the second pillar could leave 
Poland outside the expected inner circle justified? It would be indeed justified, if the 
condition for participating in closer cooperation in defense policy were to be the 
fulfillment of, for instance, convergence criteria concerning the level of defense spending 
or the ratio between spending on research and on equipment for the armed forces. In this 
case, Poland might remain on the periphery for many years.49 Such reasoning is not 
unjustified and is indicated by statements in the document entitled “Treaty of Nice – 
Polish point of view.” According to this document, “Steady development of enhanced 
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cooperation that allows for spreading investments and organizational effort over a certain 
period of time is in the interest of Poland. It has to be remembered, however, that 
participation in certain endeavors may initially be impossible.”50 However, as yet this is 
only a theoretical possibility; and even though many experts postulate implementation of 
the solution which, as in the case of economic and monetary union, would oblige the EU 
countries to develop their military capabilities, this is unlikely to take place in the near 
future.51 Therefore, considering Poland’s geopolitical position and its membership in 
NATO and the EU, it is difficult to envisage any exclusion of Poland from cooperation in 
the EU’s CFSP.   
Irrespective of the motives for Poland’s position concerning the EU’s ESDP, the 
Nice summit decisions which limited enhanced cooperation in the CFSP to common 
actions and common stands, short of matters with military or defense implications, were 
received by Poland with satisfaction. Polish officials maintain that the part of the Treaty 
“referring to enhanced cooperation serves to allay fears voiced by the present and the 
future members of the European Union.”52  
Given the Polish position as a candidate for EU membership presented in the 
documents issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the sensitivity of the 
matter and the present stage of the discussion in Poland, where enhanced cooperation is 
seen as an attempt on the part of some EU countries to avoid interaction with new 
members, one can hardly expect the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to launch new initiatives 
in this respect.53 
 However, the real opposition to closer cooperation regarding the EU’s ESDP, 
reinforced by the strongly held views of certain non-EU European members of NATO, 
makes Poland a politically unattractive partner in the implementation of this project 
because it demonstrates that Polish thinking is influenced by a desire to restrain the 
actions of others. Several countries, notably France, are using exactly this approach as an 
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argument for breaking away from the rest of the EU members and forming a vanguard of 
nations prepared to pursue more ambitious projects than the other EU members.54     
C. EUROPE: SUPERPOWER OR “STABILIZING FACTOR”  
Another important question concerns the strategy behind Polish support for the 
EU’s ESDP. The Cologne and Helsinki summits introduced the ESDP and established 
tests for further initiatives. Therefore, as an EU member Poland will participate in the 
discussion which will focus not only on the institutional shape of the second pillar and 
the European Rapid Reaction Forces but also on the political project to turn the EU into a 
world power.55 
In this sense the question about the European Union’s ambitions regarding 
security and defense is actually about the Polish vision of the EU’s future, its role in 
world politics and the meaning of the EU nations speaking and acting in unison.  
Should the long term strategy of the EU members provide for the European 
Union’s strong identity in world politics and, at the same time, make the EU a partner 
militarily equal to the United States, namely a partner capable of saying “no” and, if 
necessary, acting without or in defiance of Washington? 
Or should the role of the EU regarding security policy be restricted to the creation 
of conditions to fill in the civilizational gaps between East and West and South and 
North, and to occasional military actions to settle conflicts and restore peace? In such 
situations, the aim of the EU’s political strategy should be to create the conditions for 
further EU enlargement in order to embrace all those countries that feel themselves 
culturally connected with Europe and that are pursuing the necessary reforms. In this case 
the EU’s ESDP would consist mainly of preventive measures and support for small scale 
humanitarian interventions as a kind of militarized emergency service.56  
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Which of these two ideal types is Poland more likely to support?  Although the 
widespread lack of interest and knowledge regarding integration in the EU’s ESDP in EU 
nations rules out an unambiguous answer, today an EU that functions as a stabilizing 
factor seems to be more likely to gain Poland’s support. The Polish politicians who have 
joined in the discussion on the future of Europe have emphasized, first and foremost, the 
EU’s enlargement and the need to preserve its cohesion. Poland will support the process 
of creating a political union provided that these two conditions are fulfilled. 
However, is there any room for the EU’s global ambitions in the Polish vision of a 
political union?  According to Jan Kulakowski, the head of the Poland-EU negotiations 
team, the European Union cannot leave the solution of crises to the United States alone. 
Therefore, the EU’s ability to cope with security problems in Europe must be recognized 
as a minimum objective.57 Polish Foreign Minister Wladyslaw Bartoszewski expressed a 
similar view in stronger terms: 
Europe may become the “exporter of stability,” promoting the European 
model of a democratic state of law, respect for fundamental rights and 
freedoms and the idea of a market economy based on the law of property 
and a dialogue between social partners. For the European Union to fulfill 
the function of being a stabilizing element in Europe and in the world of 
course requires strengthening the defense dimension of European 
integration. The European Union still cannot get rid of the label of an 
economic giant and political dwarf. The war in the Persian Gulf and the 
subsequent conflict in the former Yugoslavia fully demonstrated the 
weakness of the Europeans. The thrust of the provisions of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam and the decisions set out in the conclusions of the European 
Council in Cologne in June 1999 and in Helsinki in December the same 
year seem ambitious but realistic. The member states acknowledged then 
the leading role of the UN Security Council and the North Atlantic 
Alliance in the world and European security policy and simultaneously 
confirmed their aspirations for autonomous activities in the military sphere 
with the possible use of the assets and infrastructure of NATO. The 
success of this project would strengthen the concept of a European 
Security and Defense Policy. The ESDP, in the sense of a higher stage of 
the CFSP, should in itself create a certain integration impulse for the EU. 
It may also be important for internal politics because it will legitimize the 
European Union in the eyes of its own citizens. The same psychological 
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mechanism plays a role in the case of the forces of the nation state, namely 
that a strong state must have effective armed forces.58 
In view of the EU’s present weakness in international politics, the Polish 
standpoint is quite ambitious. At the same time the tendency to confine the nation’s 
intellectual horizons to the current aspects of integration under the second pillar, 
numerous vague statements (for instance, “ability to cope with security problems in 
Europe must be recognized as a bare minimum,” “a certain integration impulse”), and the 
belief that enhanced cooperation should concentrate mainly on internal policy do not 
allow one to call the European Security and Defense Policy a prospect particularly 
attractive to Poland.59  
Based on these observations it can be said that in the eyes of Poland, European 
integration is primarily a process that promotes increased security in Europe. The EU has 
been a stabilizing factor. The idea of the European Union as a great power or world 
power does not stimulate any special interest in Poland, at least not at the present stage of 
the discussion about the EU’s ESDP. 
The cautious Polish reaction to the decisions of the Helsinki summit regarding the 
development of the EU’s ESDP seems partly due to Poland’s disappointment with the 
date of its inclusion in the European Union. While the Polish expectations may have been 
unrealistic, it is a fact that the Helsinki summit decisions caused noticeable discontent. 
Warsaw was not only not given a date for its EU membership but also was formally put 
on the same footing as another group of candidate countries, which were to start 
negotiations with the EU several months after the conclusion of the EU Finnish 
Presidency in January 2000. This manner of dealing with enlargement, at a time when the 
EU was deciding on the foundations for the ESDP, led Poles to question the cogency of 
the rationale for the ESDP.60 A well-known expert on Poland’s security policy argued 
that “Europe is avoiding the enlargement by calling for another Maastricht, Amsterdam 
or Nice Treaty or finding for itself substitute topics such as Charters of Rights or the 
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European Security and Defense Policy wherein the pompous name masks the intention to 
develop rapid reaction forces.”61 
Consequently, Poland’s attitude as a candidate for membership in the EU towards 
the EU’s ESDP was influenced by its deteriorating relations with the European Union. 
Warsaw’s weariness regarding the prolonged negotiations with the EU and at that time 
the absence of any definite date for EU membership was increased by its awareness that 
in comparison with the EU the Atlantic Alliance had risen to the occasion and had 
established a long-term program for its enlargement, including a number of criteria that 
had to be fulfilled by the candidates.62 NATO invited Poland (and Hungary and the 
Czech Republic) to join at the July 1997 Madrid summit, and the membership process 
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IV. ELEMENTS AFFECTING PERCEPTIONS OF THE ESDP IN 
POLAND 
At present, Polish politicians still have many concerns about security and defense 
in Europe. The uncertainties and doubts about the EU’s ESDP result not only from the 
current international context. The background to the discussion about the EU’s greater 
independence with regard to security and defense policy must be sought in the following 
questions: Why have some of the NATO member states decided to support the EU’s 
ESDP? How will this step affect relations with the United States? What will be the 
Alliance’s actual roles in Europe and beyond? And, in this situation, to what extent will 
the EU’s ESDP improve or endanger the security of Poland? 
A. LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
The factor that has had the most important impact on Polish thinking about the 
EU’s ESDP is the persisting disbelief in the European Union’s ability and determination 
to fulfill its ambitions. Experiences in the Balkans in 1991 - 1999 confirmed Poland’s 
belief that military security in Europe is the responsibility of the US-led Atlantic 
Alliance, while the EU is only capable of conducting simple, small-scale operations. In 
1999 the Polish Minister of National Defense, Janusz Onyszkiewicz, argued that NATO, 
an organization in which the Americans play a decisive role and provide leadership, is the 
only guarantee for security in Europe because “once the US gets involved, the critical 
mass is achieved. No European country is capable of producing a comparable effect. All 
this means that not Europe but NATO with the US is an organization that is reasonably 
efficient and that can rapidly and effectively enough respond to the challenges of the 20th  
century and the next century.”63 The Polish minister of defense also stated that plans to 
develop a defense policy within the EU did not have favorable prospects because the 
European Union included a number of neutral countries whose commitments in this 
regard would not be clear. According to Janusz Onyszkiewicz, economic considerations 
argued for the pursuit of the European Union’s ambitions within the NATO security 
framework, thereby avoiding duplication of the Alliance structures. In his view, the 
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European Union was unable to finance “either the infrastructure or the logistics 
permitting a swift long distance transfer of large forces. […] There is only one 
conclusion: Europe’s greater activity must rest on NATO structures.”64  
In addition, it seems that the EU’s failures in Bosnia and Herzegovina did not 
surprise Poland but rather confirmed the lessons it drew from the 20th century: “The 
European would not like to die for Europe.”65 In the countries of Western Europe, 
powerless against ethnic cleansing, the war in the former Yugoslavia produced a feeling 
of wounded pride caused by their overall dependence on US support. For Britain and 
France the war in Bosnia was not only a testimony to their own weakness but also a 
revelation of how unpredictable US policy could be.66 Poland did not go through such an 
experience.  
A similar episode took place during a discussion about the Kosovo war. For Poles 
this conflict reflected another manifestation of European weakness and dependence on 
American support. Warsaw accepted with understanding the fact that due to Poland’s 
lack of suitable military aircraft, Poland was not invited to take part in the air campaign 
in the Kosovo operations. However, in February 1999 the Polish Minister of Defense, 
Janusz Onyszkiewicz, declared that if there was a need, Polish Army units would take 
part in the Alliance’s operations. A week later, the ministry spokesmen announced that 
Poland could contribute a battalion to the SFOR rapid reaction reserve forces in Bosnia 
and that it was still not certain whether Polish soldiers would be included in a combat 
operation or only in the peace keeping mission. Three months later, when it was clear that 
air strikes on Serb positions were not producing the expected results, it was also generally 
known that Poland was not considering participation in a possible ground combat 
operation, but only in a peace keeping mission. Onyszkiewicz stated that if a ground 
force intervention was considered, Poland would participate in reaching such a decision; 
and this was a simple confirmation of the fact that Poland was a member of NATO.67  
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Although unable to contribute to the air combat operation in any significant way, 
Poland granted it its entire political support.68 In this manner the “Kosovo syndrome,” 
which led EU governments to call for improvements in their military capabilities, did not 
affect Poland. 
In the relevant statements by Polish diplomats and politicians as well as in media 
analyses in Poland of NATO’s intervention in the Kosovo conflict, the US military’s 
preponderant role in the operations in comparison with that of the European allies 
appeared as external phenomena that did not concern Poland. The mistakes by 
Washington that were criticized by Paris and London escaped Warsaw’s notice, while at 
the same time the shortcomings of the European allies’ equipment and capabilities  were 
not recognized as a disadvantage for Poland. Moreover, certain countries’ unfavorable 
reaction to the U.S. conduct, which to some extent prepared the way for the EU decision 
to develop a common European Security and Defense Policy, until this day has met with 
a lack of understanding in Warsaw. In one of his speeches, Polish Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Wladyslaw Bartoszewski observed that “the course of the discussion on the EU’s 
ESDP indicates that the Europeans would like to exploit all the infrastructures, 
everything that can be learned from the US experience, and in exchange for this 
independently decide what to do using the American assets. I see something 
schizophrenic in it, because if Europe has for several years been unable to find a recipe 
for effective help to the people of the Balkans, and has only relied on this or another US 
intervention only to keep its distance and sometimes to criticize, then I see a certain 
hypocrisy in all this.”69  
Polish politicians not only do not share this hypocrisy but also undoubtedly 
believe that Poland has passed the Kosovo exam. As a new member of NATO much less 
was expected from Poland than from longstanding allies. In point of fact, the challenging 
ambition of the Polish government was to pledge political support for NATO’s Kosovo 
intervention in circumstances in which the reactions of both the public and the political 
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class were uncertain. On the other hand, it should be recalled that the European allies 
could not depend on any significant military contribution from Poland and that they had 
to fill the gap resulting from the Polish lack of suitable air combat capabilities at that 
time. Finally, unlike in some other countries, for instance Germany, the Kosovo war did 
not provoke in Poland any discussion about new types of threats or new requirements for 
the armed forces.70  
B. PERCEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 
One of the recurrent questions concerning the EU’s ESDP is the significance of 
the entire concept for the Alliance’s future. In the eyes of foreign observers, the reaction 
of the Polish mass media and politicians to the modest plans to equip the EU with a 
military component was exaggerated. The indications that the EU’s ESDP might collapse 
anyway, owing to major political differences, the EU’s lack of an institutional culture 
comparable to that of NATO, and the continued low expenditures on military 
modernization, suggested that the Poles were excessively concerned.71  
In order to understand this ambivalence, one should refer to another question, 
namely the Polish perception of Poland’s external security requirements and the related 
role of NATO and, in point of fact, of the United States. Poles tend to believe that 
collective defense is the primary task of the Alliance, not operations in support of 
collective security outside the NATO area. During the Polish Parliament’s debate on the 
nation’s foreign policy in April 1999, Minister of Foreign Affairs Bronislaw Geremek 
argued that “with regard to the reform of NATO doctrine being prepared for the 
Washington summit […] our position is that we want NATO to keep its Article 5 in 
force, the force of the defense alliance that it has had for fifty years.”72  
Although this principle is reflected in the strategy of NATO and Article 5 is still 
binding, its practical significance has decreased in situations in which international 
security is threatened by Balkan-type conflicts. However, large-scale terrorist attacks and 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and delivery means to regional powers 
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have underscored the continuing relevance of Article 5. In view of Poland’s unstable 
neighborhood and historical experience, Warsaw has unenthusiastically agreed to 
NATO’s involvement in other activities and particularly its efforts to satisfy the needs of 
the EU. The point is not an objection to the peace-keeping missions to which Poland has 
contributed, but an apprehension that these missions could place demands on the Alliance 
at the expense of its other obligations. Polish Defense Minister Bronislaw Komorowski 
argued that “the European defense initiative will subtract from the already insufficient 
resources of NATO; it will develop outside NATO and will weaken the Alliance.”73 
Moreover, this apprehension also derives from uncertainty as to whether the EU, which 
may someday achieve the capability goals that it established for itself in Helsinki, may go 
further and attempt to become also an organization responsible for the collective defense 
of its members.74   
To all these doubts can also be added the awareness of Poland’s own military 
weakness, which does not allow it to face even a minor conflict in the east on its own. 
Therefore, Polish Defense Minister Bronislaw Komorowski argued that “as long as there 
is no European organization capable of mobilizing two heavy divisions that in an 
emergency would turn up on Polish territory – in the event of a threat [of aggression or 
coercion], not in the event of war – I believe Poland should show great restraint in 
reorienting its thinking about its own security and about the functioning of NATO 
towards a solely European [Union] track. And this is because the concept of European 
[Union] forces will for a long period of time undoubtedly compete with the present rules 
applying to NATO operations.”75  
The European Union’s European Security and Defense Policy is for the most part 
perceived in Poland as a military plan. However, the EU’s ESDP is actually a 
manifestation of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, and its 
primary endeavor is not to organize an intervention army but to fulfill the political goals 
of the EU. The EU’s CFSP and ESDP provide also for a strong civilian component, 
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which will be responsible for the fulfillment of non-military tasks, for instance 
observation missions and the administration of regions devastated by civil wars. 
Therefore, disregarding this aspect of the discussion about the EU’s ESDP, Polish 
politicians see no close relationship between these two components of the EU’s second 
pillar, namely between the ESDP and the CFSP. On the other hand, considering the 
future of the EU, these two policies together will become the foundation for its strategy 
with reference to the states remaining outside the EU.76 
C. RUSSIAN AND FRENCH POLICIES 
The distrust of the EU’s emerging ESDP arises also from concerns about political 
consequences associated with the policies of Russia and France.  
In the opinion of a high ranking official of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Ryszard Mroziewicz, “implementation of this new establishment, namely ESDP, will 
naturally involve a change in the US presence in Europe. As the Helsinki records say that 
in keeping with the relevant agreements in the area of security and defense the European 
Union will cooperate with Russia and Ukraine, our misgivings are about whether this is 
not in some way synonymous to inviting Russia to participate in solving crises together 
with the EU and not necessarily with the approval of the ally from across the Atlantic.”77 
The fear that Russia, encouraged by the EU policy standpoint, might use the 
ESDP plan to force a proverbial wedge between Europe and the United States, results 
also from the fact that the EU defense policy is subject to the authority of the United 
Nations Charter. Some Poles fear that this means that formally the EU is making its 
operations dependent on the Security Council’s permission, which is not the case for the 
Alliance’s operations.78 This fear seems to be based on a misunderstanding. Both NATO 
and the EU maintain that their international security activities are based on the UN 
Charter, but neither NATO nor the EU has declared itself a “regional arrangement” in the 
sense of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.   
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Dmitriy Danilov and Stephan De Spiegeleire argued in 1998 that “the 
development of West European integration and transatlantic relations in the sphere of 
security seem to point in the direction of a marked strengthening and rapprochement of 
the relevant West European institutions (WEU and EU's CFSP) and consequently of 
increased European roles and responsibilities. These developments would be perceived 
quite positively in Russia, as they could translate into an institutional embodiment of a 
West European component of NATO and its transformation into a new Euro-Atlantic 
Alliance, which in turn may give Russia added incentives and instruments for 
cooperation with it.”79      
Does the EU realize why Russia has received the ESDP so warmly? Is the EU 
ready to establish closer cooperation with Russia than is necessary? 
Although the EU has established various cooperation agreements with Russia, it 
has no intention of including Russia in ESDP decision-making. The enhanced dialogue 
and cooperation with Russia do not justify an observation that the EU might in any way 
prefer Moscow to Washington. Given that at least some EU political leaders are aware of 
the reason why the Kremlin supports the idea of the ESDP, Russia can hardly expect to 
gain anything more than invitations to cooperate in specific and carefully defined 
activities. Because the EU intends to cooperate with NATO, it is difficult to imagine that 
the European Union might offer Moscow anything in the international security field 
beyond the issues considered by the NATO-Russia Council. Any excessive concession to 
Russia could lead to a negative reaction from some NATO members and, therefore, make 
it more difficult for the EU to enjoy access to NATO assets.80  
This, however, does not change the fact that if some EU members wanted to 
decide on a dialogue with Russia regarding cooperation within the ESDP framework 
without listening to the opinions of other EU members, including Poland, the EU would 
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risk a conflict that could have a permanent and adverse effect on the ESDP and, in 
particular, on Poland’s position regarding this policy.81 
In the discussions on the EU’s ESDP in Poland it has been uncommon for Poles 
to raise the argument that the EU’s autonomous operations, even those fulfilled using 
NATO assets, would not produce as much Russian resistance as possible NATO 
operations. As the tragedy of the Kursk submarine in August 2000 revealed, for Moscow 
the Alliance can sometimes represent a bigger problem with regard to political rivalry 
and the hostile picture drawn for domestic purposes than is justified on objective grounds. 
Therefore, by relying in some circumstances on the EU’s ESDP instead of NATO, 
Poland might gain another useful instrument for its eastern policy; namely, Poland and its 
EU partners might in some cases effectively prevent crises without annoying Russia 
unnecessarily.82  
The problem regarding France’s role in the shaping of the EU’s ESDP constitutes 
a peculiar aspect of the Polish discussion. Polish politicians and diplomats seem to 
believe that “there is only one thing worse than a European conspiracy: a French-inspired 
European conspiracy.”83 Therefore, Poland suspects that France’s designs greatly exceed 
its declared intentions and that its ultimate goal is to achieve the Gaullist vision of 
making the EU a partner equal to and independent of NATO by weakening US political 
influence in Europe. These suspicions arise not only from interpretations of history but 
also from the EU’s consultations with NATO; in these consultations France has acted as 
the guardian of the European Union’s independence.84  
Although French diplomatic conduct regarding the EU’s ESDP has encountered 
criticism from many European politicians and NATO diplomats, Polish reactions have 
often been provoked by the rhetoric of French politicians whose language is by no means 
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characteristic of all EU members. Therefore, Polish opposition to France’s apparent 
intentions translates into opposition to the entire concept of the EU’s ESDP.85  
The mistrust of France’s intentions seems to represent one of the greatest factors 
preventing Poland from seeing in the EU’s ESDP an opportunity for its policy. 
Characteristic in this respect is the opinion of Jerzy Jastrzebowski, a Polish expert in 
international relations, who has argued that “For Poland the future of the uniting Europe 
is too important an issue to leave to confrontational Europeans alone, especially the 
French who are particularly irritable with regard to economic and cultural leadership in 
Europe. […] For Poland the lasting presence of the US in Europe is at least as important 
as the attempts to minimize American influence in Europe are to some French 
politicians.”86  
However, without France’s willingness to recognize the reasons for Polish 
reservations, even if from a French perspective they seem to be inexplicable and 
influenced by the United States, the EU’s ESDP might not promote substantive Polish-
French cooperation either in the forum of the Weimar Triangle (Berlin, Paris and 
Warsaw) or in the forum of the European Union.87        
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This analysis of the main elements of Poland’s official position towards the EU’s 
ESDP suggests the factors that have influenced this position.  
Poland has been concerned, first and foremost, by the clash of different 
perspectives and political rivalry between the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance. 
As a member of both NATO and the EU, Poland has naturally been a party to all the 
political disagreements. The consequences of these disagreements concern Poland and 
the other member states of NATO and the EU. Therefore, the postulates of Polish 
diplomacy -- the demand for consultations regarding relations between the EU and 
NATO and recognition of the exceptional status of the six non-EU European members of 
NATO -- were considered as nothing extraordinary and were placed in the general 
framework of discussions among the NATO allies. 
On the other hand, Warsaw has been one of the capitals most opposed to the 
obstacles created by the EU’s policy towards the Alliance. This touchiness is explicable 
in light of what membership in NATO means to Poland in its national historical context, 
and how sensitive Polish policy is to changes in the international security environment. In 
this sense, concerns about the EU’s ESDP, particularly following the Kosovo war, were 
considered a test for Poland to handle in conjunction with other conflicts within the 
Alliance.  
Another factor that has had a strong impact on Poland’s policy concerning the 
EU’s ESDP has been the lack of clarity with regard to the real motives behind the policy 
line adopted by the European Union member states. This factor has two dimensions. 
The first dimension is related to the character of the ongoing processes, because 
their results and consequences are not predictable. In this regard, although the wording of 
the relevant EU documents and speeches leaves no doubt that the EU’s ESDP is a project 
complementary to NATO and intended to reinforce the transatlantic ties, it is not clear 
where this process might lead the EU member nations and the NATO allies in the long 
run. 
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The second dimension represents an effect of misunderstanding concerning the 
EU’s intentions, which has been reinforced by insufficient knowledge with regard to 
current changes in Euro-Atlantic security arrangements. Therefore, Polish perceptions of 
the EU’s ESDP as a political adventure have been driven by the overstated ambitions of 
some European Union countries, first of all France. This is the explanation of Polish 
restraint concerning arguments acknowledging the beneficial influence of the EU’s ESDP 
on improvements in the Alliance’s military capabilities as well as on the integration of 
European Union defense industries and the reform of the armed forces of European 
Union member nations. Moreover, it has been difficult to identify any advantages the 
European Union’s security and defense policy might offer to Poland in the future. 
These two elements, concerns about the Alliance’s determination and doubts 
about the EU’s policy, gave not only dynamism but also a unique character to Polish 
discussions about the ESDP. These quarrels have inevitably been reflected in the Polish 
position towards the EU’s ESDP. Poland’s sensitivity to security questions has been 
reinforced by its disappointment with the EU policy regarding the enlargement process. 
Yet a third factor must be noted. Polish policy had for a long time been uncertain 
about what steps might reinforce the importance of NATO and about whether to regard 
the EU’s ESDP as an element in the EU’s political integration. Although officially 
Warsaw declared that the European Union’s security and defense policy was a realistic 
project and that the failure of that project was neither in the interest of Europe nor in the 
interest of Poland, it was unsuccessful in winning practical support for this opinion in 
Polish society.88 In other words, Poland’s status as an applicant country for EU 
membership did not prevent Poles from expressing their views candidly. 
Although these three factors did not fundamentally change the way in which 
Poland’s attitude towards the EU’s ESDP was perceived, Polish policy-makers 
considered them with interest. These factors showed some of the thinking behind 
Warsaw’s misgivings. Undoubtedly, these uncertainties were related to Poland’s interests 
and did not constitute an effort to block the EU activities. This, however, does not change 
the fact that there still have not been enough Polish initiatives to convince the other EU 
 42
member states about Poland’s pro-European course with regard to security and defense 
matters. In his speech at Warsaw University in May 2001 the Polish Minister of Foreign 
Affairs observed that “It is justified to ask about Poland’s stance on the EU’s ambitious 
endeavor of the ESDP. This is not only because our position regarding this matter 
remains unknown, but, first and foremost, because on the basis of the discussion taking 
place [in Poland] among experts and in press articles concerning this subject, one might 
get a wrong impression, namely that Poland holds itself distant from -- or has some 
reservations about -- the EU’s ESDP.”89  
However, the relevant Polish position has undergone substantial modifications 
visible in the balance between NATO and the EU in Warsaw’s statements and actions as 
well as in the reduction of the fear that Poland’s support for the ESDP might undermine 
its relations with the United States. This is a result of the gradual clarification of issues 
such as the participation of non-EU European members of NATO in the decision-shaping 
process within the ESDP framework and also a general change of attitude in Poland 
towards the discussions taking place within the European Union.  
In the Polish position towards the EU’s ESDP the ambition to have a voice in this 
policy-shaping process and its further development was and still is in conflict with the 
limited military capabilities that Poland can offer to the EU. Poland’s postulates 
concerning the acknowledgement by the EU of the special role of the six non-EU 
European members of NATO were based on its membership in NATO and its associate 
membership in the Western European Union. However, as Polish politicians have 
repeatedly argued, the development of the ESDP should concentrate on honoring national 
capabilities commitments and not on institutional disputes.  
Although the Polish Defense Minister, Bronislaw Komorowski, offered a 
framework brigade at the EU Capabilities Commitment Conference in May 2001, he did 
not specify the exact number of troops, arguing that Poland wanted to be free to raise this 
number.90  
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At the same time Komorowski did not conceal the fact that increasing Poland’s 
commitment would be difficult.  
There are the constant questions whether we have not undertaken a 
number of commitments and obligations to NATO too quickly. The Polish 
inclination to make offers without counting the money first makes the 
situation difficult. This makes it necessary to reallocate resources in the 
defense budget and to concentrate them on the NATO goals. It is 
impossible to develop or bear the expense of two processes at the same 
time. Poland is bound by its duty to make a great financial effort on behalf 
of the goals agreed with the Alliance. This is a great strain and I do not 
believe that we can engage in anything else at the same time. I do not 
believe that it is possible to take advantage of the programs which result 
from our integration with NATO, and to participate in the European 
[Union’s] armed forces. Not all the programs that are crucial from the 
point of view of our participation in the European [Union’s] armed forces 
can be used in order to meet our obligations arising from our membership 
in NATO.91   
A. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE  
Poland is currently better equipped to contribute to the non-military dimension of 
the EU’s ESDP than to the military combat dimension. The non-military dimension not 
only encompasses the most likely future EU operations but is also considered a domain in 
which the EU will have to seek support. For the time being, it is less expensive for 
Poland to contribute to the civilian policy component than to train and equip additional 
mobile and interoperable armed troops. 
Will Poland’s membership in the EU, which will enable it to participate fully in 
EU institutions, make Warsaw an ESDP enthusiast? Do the EU’s current crisis 
management capabilities make Poles feel more secure? Is Poland interested in actively 
supporting the development of the EU’s ESDP? Is the only goal of Polish policy to 
maintain that the EU should not move too far away from NATO? 
The current status of the discussion suggests the following answer. The concept of 
using the military dimension of the EU to strengthen Poland’s security does not evoke 
much interest because the country’s geopolitical situation at NATO’s easternmost border 
obliges Polish policy-makers as well as the armed forces to think mainly about defense, 
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and not about crisis management outside the NATO area. Poles continue to perceive the 
EU’s ESDP as a policy competing with that of NATO, both politically and militarily. 
Because the EU’s ESDP does not seem to offer an answer to Polish security requirements 
and support for it is a matter of political necessity rather than choice, Poles do not have 
much confidence in its success and are by no means full of enthusiasm for it. A clear 
majority of Polish politicians believe that if European nations had really wanted to make 
a breakthrough, they could have done so by making use of existing organizations and 
mechanisms, particularly those of NATO and the Western European Union.  
Could Poland’s membership in the EU contribute to a major breakthrough in 
ESDP development? It could do so, but Poland would have to change its perception of 
security requirements and give more attention to non-military challenges. This would 
depend on the course of events in the East, primarily in Russia and Belarus. Democracy 
and constructive international security policies in these countries constitute the primary 
conditions that would allow Poland to dispense with the fear of participating in projects 
that might cause tensions in its relations with NATO and the United States in particular. 
Only in such circumstances would Poland be able to think differently about the role of 
the armed forces and pay more attention to crisis management outside the NATO area. 
Moreover, from the Polish perspective, European integration is not perceived as a 
political process aimed at turning the EU into a military power. However, Polish views in 
this regard may change, depending on the nation’s experience as a member of the 
European Union.  
With Poland’s admission to the EU in May 2004, Warsaw will have an 
opportunity to contribute to ESDP formation and implementation. However, Poland will 
probably remain committed to maintaining NATO’s primacy and cautious regarding 
concepts of transforming the EU into an autonomous military power, especially with 
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